When is the word “minister” defined as more than a religious leader and the word “church” defined as more than a house of worship? Within the employment law context, these definitions may significantly impact religious employers, as recently explained through three federal court of appeals decisions - Markel, McMahon, and Union Gospel. While these cases’ direct applicability is limited to the Ninth Circuit (covering Washington, California and other western states), they each build significantly on U.S. Supreme Court precedent and other key religious liberty decisions favoring expanded employer protections. These decisions thus provide potent opportunities for judicial expansion elsewhere, expanding religious liberty protections for employers in other jurisdictions.
Overview of Employment Cases – Religious Liberty Protections
The well-recognized “ministerial exception” provides tremendous legal protection to religious organizations’ employment decisions – effectively closing the litigation door against certain employee claims such as for unlawful discrimination. This level of such protections has developed through various court rulings analyzing whether certain jobs qualify as sufficiently religious, reaching beyond the context of a church or other house of worship. Just how expansively does this religious liberty protection apply? A trio of recent cases address such issues, with the answer in two cases hinging on the definition of a “minister” and the third decision applying the more extensive church autonomy doctrine instead.
In all three cases addressed in this article, Markel, McMahon, and Union Gospel, the courts unquestionably recognized the employers as religious. The Markel and McMahon decisions additionally evaluated whether each employee’s work involves “vital religious duties” that are sufficiently “ministerial” (respectively, a food preparation employee and a customer service employee). Union Gospel took a big step further by recognizing that employers are entitled to religious liberty protections for both employees engaged in activities of a significantly religious nature (“ministerial”) and other employees (“non-ministerial”) who simply work for a religious employer. How? The Union Gospel court applied the “church autonomy doctrine” to employers hiring only “co-religionists” – that is, persons who agree with the employers’ religious beliefs and values – in order to advance employers’ religious mission and correspondingly to guard against government intrusion.
Remarkably, all three court rulings were decided by distinct three-judge panels of the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which some would view as less favorably inclined to support religious liberty rights. Not so in these cases. Each court ruling applied these critical legal terms flexibly and favorably towards the employers’ religious freedom to carry out their mission in employment-related decisions. Union Gospel is undoubtedly most significant, profoundly impacting the legal landscape by using the church autonomy doctrine beyond the church context for “non-ministerial” employees, with its accompanying recognition that the ministerial exception is only a “component” and “narrow offshoot” of the doctrine.[1] Together, these cases illustrate how employees’ adverse claims against religious employers may be barred considerably well beyond the clergy-church context (and thus the church autonomy doctrine may be considered as somewhat of a misnomer, at least as applied in Union Gospel).
The following sections dive into each case’s facts, legal analysis, and resulting takeaway. Together, these cases exemplify continued expansion of available religious liberty protections for employers.
Keeping Kosher - Broad View of “Religious Institution” and “Minister”
Context: Orthodox Jewish Employer + Mashgiach Employee
In Markel v. Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision holding that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred a claim brought by appellant Yaakov Markel, a mashgiach or Orthodox Jew who supervises food preparation to ensure kosher compliance, against his employer, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (“OU”) . OU is a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit with a mission to serve the Orthodox Jewish community through a kosher certification program. OU is not a Jewish synagogue or other house of worship; rather, it supports a network of synagogues through providing religious programming, advocacy, and youth programs. OU charges fees for its kosher food certification, and such fees provide most of its revenues.
Markel was responsible for the kosher integrity of grape products at two wineries as part of OU’s kosher team. To qualify to serve as a mashgiach, Markel needed to submit a letter from an Orthodox rabbi certifying that he was Sabbath observant, knowledgeable about kosher law, and compliant with the same. If Markel had questions about Jewish law, he was to ask one of OU’s Jewish law scholars, known as poskim, for instruction and direction. Markel’s and OU’s employment later became adversarial, and he asserted claims of fraudulent denial of a promotion and a raise as well as overtime compensation.
Legal Analysis: Religious Institution + Minister
On summary judgment appeal from a ruling favoring OU, the Ninth Circuit first recognized the applicability of the ministerial exception as a matter of constitutional dimension under the First Amendment, protecting a religious organization’s autonomy regarding internal management including employment matters generally. Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2020 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru decision, the appellate court recognized that “the Religious Clauses require deference to a ‘religious institution’s explanation of the role of [its] employees in the life of the religion in question’” and therefore “’it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act’ as one of these mission-critical employees.”
With such religious dynamics in view, effectively barring all employment-related claims, the court then addressed the all-important questions of whether (1) OU is a “religious institution” that could enjoy the protections of the ministerial exception, and (2) if Markel’s mashgiach position rendered him a “minister.” The court answered both questions affirmatively.
As an initial matter, the court rejected the notion that the fact OU’s kosher certification program earned revenue necessarily defeated the ministerial exception. Moving onward, the court observed that the term “religious institution” is not a defined term, with no rigid formula for application. Citing Spencer v. World Vision, a 2011 Ninth Circuit ruling, the court evaluated whether OU 1) has a religious mission; 2) is engaged primarily in carrying out that religious purpose; 3) holds itself out to the public as carrying out such religious mission; and 4) is not primarily engaged in commercial activities. The court concluded that the first three factors favored OU since it is undisputedly organized to support the Orthodox Jewish community through religious programming. As for the fourth factor, the court declined to find that revenue generation rendered OU insufficiently religious (citing the Supreme Court’s 2014 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. decision), especially since such revenue did not benefit any private interest. The court then concluded that OU met the “religious institution” test.
Regarding the second question of whether Markel was a “minister,” the court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s landmark 2011 Hosanna-Tabor[2] decision, in which it was similarly recognized that such term should not be rigidly defined, as well as the court’s subsequent Our Lady of Guadalupe 2020 ruling.[3] The Ninth Circuit instructed that no one-size-fits-all approach should be used: “What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does” (quoting Our Lady, in turn quoting Hosanna-Tabor). Expanding on this foundational concept, the appellate court concluded that a broad view should be taken of who counts as a minister.
Result: Ministerial Exception Bars Employee’s Claims
Applying such legal principles to Markel, the court held that he was a “minister” in his role as a mashgiach, since such work was essential to OU’s religious mission. In so ruling, the court rejected Markel’s argument that because his dispute with OU was secular, his claim should be barred based on nonsecular religious grounds. Instead, the court concluded that a religious institution like OU is not legally required to identify any religious justification for its employment-related decisions, regardless of the nature of an employee’s claim. The court elaborated that the danger of excessive entanglement forbids such approach, particularly with respect to the substantial risk of intertwined government scrutiny unduly burdening religious organizations. No religious justification is required; the minister’s claims are categorically barred against the religious institution.
Customer Service - on Mission
Context: Christian Ministry + Customer Service Representative Applicant
In McMahon v. World Vision, decided in in August 2025, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision for the employee Aubry McMahon against World Vision, a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit, with a mission to share the gospel of Jesus Christ through “humanitarian outreach to children and families around the world who are poor and underserved.” In this case, World Vision had extended a job offer to McMahon for a remote customer service representative position (“CSR”), but then revoked the job offer upon learning of her same-sex marriage.
World Vision pursues its mission through partnership with donors, prayer supporters, and churches, and it holds itself out to the public as a Christian ministry. All World Vision staff members are trained on the importance of prayer, expected to spend time regularly in devotions, and also expected to attend weekly worship services. Relevant to the CSR position, the job description sets forth World Vision’s expectations that the CSR would serve as a “liaison between donors and the general public” providing “basic levels of customer service for all special programs.” Correspondingly, each CSR is expected to “[h]elp carry out [World Vision’s] mission, vision, strategies,” “[p]ersonify the ministry of World Vision by witnessing to Christ and ministering to others,” and “[k]eep Christ central in [their] individual and corporate lives.”
Additionally, World Vision provides “Standards of Conduct” to current and prospective employees, which they must affirm as a condition of employment. One of these standards is that Biblical marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman. In applying for the CSR position, McMahon affirmed World Vision’s Standards of Conduct. Upon revocation of her job offer, McMahon sued World Vision for unlawful discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of McMahon and therefore rejected World Vision’s ministerial exception defense, and World Vision appealed.
Legal Analysis: What Employee Does + Vital Religious Duties + Mission
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first noted that the ministerial exception protects religious organizations as an exception and is therefore to be applied on a limited basis, not necessarily on an organization-wide basis. As in Markel, the court recognized the legal significance of Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady along with the accompanying principle that the ministerial exception is not to be applied according to any rigid formula. The court then focused on key elements from Our Lady, namely “what an employee does” and “whether they perform ‘vital religious duties’’’ (quoting Our Lady). The court further noted that it is the employer’s burden to prove this defense – here, whether the World Vision employee working as a CSR is a “minister.”
Specifically evaluating the CSR position, the court looked to other recent cases applying the ministerial exception including Markel: “The common thread between these cases is that the Catholic schoolteacher in Our Lady, the work practice apprentice in Behrend [involving a Zen Buddhist temple worker], and the mashgiach in Markel all performed ‘vital religious duties’ in light of the core missions of their respective organizations.”
Result: Ministerial Exception Bars Employee’s Claims, Within Context
The parties did not dispute that World Vision is a religious institution; the prime question involves whether a CSR working at World Vision is a minister. Considering this question, the court rejected analyzing job duties in isolation and instead considered the CSR duties in context. When wholly viewed, the court determined the CSR position indeed performs “vital religious duties” furthering World Vision’s religious mission. As one example, the court noted that CSRs are expected to pray with donors about their needs and those of ministry recipients as well as to share their Christian faith. Indeed, as the court recognized, CSRs “support donors’ religious transformation by ‘inspiring those donors who share World Vision’s faith and by sharing that faith with those who don’t.’” Consequently, although the CSR job description listed primarily secular and administrative duties (e.g., answering phone call), other required qualities were grounded thoroughly in religious requirements (e.g., sharing the gospel). The Ninth Circuit thus held that World Vision had met its burden to prove that the CSR position qualifies for the ministerial exception, thereby barring McMahon’s discrimination claims.
In so ruling in the employer’s favor, the court rejected the employee’s argument that a universal application of certain religious requirements such as prayer, worship services, and devotions watered down the ministerial exception’s applicability. Instead, the court determined that such religious requirements, while not alone dispositive, may still contribute to the contextual conclusion that an employee’s position (such as McMahon’s) is central to the religious organization’s core mission. The legal analysis is thus on a case-by-case basis among employees based on elements such as their job descriptions, in order to identify what they do and whether they perform the requisite “vital religious duties’’ related to their employers’ religious missions. Ultimately for McMahon, the court held that the ministerial exception applied to bar her claim because CSRs serve as World Vision’s “voice,” responsible for communicating its religious mission through ministry engagement with donors and directly related mission advancement.
Birds of a Feather – Co-Religionist Hiring Decisions
Context: Christian Ministry Employer + Non-Ministerial Applicant
In Union Gospel Mission of Yakima Washington v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit Court upheld a preliminary injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) against the Union Gospel Mission of Yakima, Washington. Union Gospel is a private non-profit Christian ministry with the stated religious mission to, “spread the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ,” focusing on “Christ-centered rescue.” Union Gospel carries out its mission through assisting people in homelessness to move from homelessness to wholeness through operating a homeless shelter, faith-based recovery programs, health clinics, and meal services. Everyone served is encouraged to “develop a relationship with Jesus Christ.”
Union Gospel commenced litigation to clarify its legal right to hire employees who agree with its religious beliefs, adhere to its religious tenets, and comply with related behavior requirements. As such, Union Gospel argued that the WLAD should not be applicable based on First Amendment religious liberty protections.
Legal Analysis: Religious Institution + Sincere Religious Belief + Hiring Based on Religious Standards
Focusing on this case’s hiring context, the court first recognized that “the church autonomy doctrine . . . forbids government intrusion into the ‘internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central mission’” (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe). The court then evaluated to what extent requiring all employees to be Christians (i.e., co-religionists) is essential to Union Gospel’s Christian mission, as an internal management decision. The court concluded favorably to Union Gospel, based on the following findings and related observations:
Deciding who can work non-ministerial roles for a religious organization may be a matter of religious faith and doctrine” . . . . Union Gospel . . . insists that hiring only co-religionists in non-ministerial roles is critical to serving its mission and spreading its message. That’s because its non-ministerial employees foster a community and support system for its outward-facing ministry. They do this by supporting one another in their faith journeys, praying for each other, sharing Scripture, and setting an example of how to live a Christian life. Union Gospel also maintains that employing likeminded believers in non-ministerial roles helps ensure that it communicates a united and consistent religious message to the public. At the very least, its employment policy prevents Union Gospel’s own employees from openly undermining its religious message. And the policy helps shield employees and the public it serves from what it perceives to be sinful habits or behaviors. Indeed, if a religious organization were forced to hire those who flout and disregard its religious beliefs, it may forego engagement with the public in the first place. (Slip Op. at 22-23).
In summary, the court determined that Union Gospel accomplishes its religious mission through its employees, who must sign statement of faith, comply with religious standards, and otherwise as described above. The court further concluded that in light of Union Gospel’s strongly religious identity, the church autonomy doctrine protects it from government interference – namely, through non-enforcement of the WLAD’s anti-discrimination law against such religious employers.
The court further referenced McMahon, noting that the McMahon court did not require any additional showing that the employment decision at issue was “made for a religious reason” since the job qualified for the ministerial exception. Similarly, the Markel court did not analyze whether the employment action at issue was based on any religious justification, since it concluded that the ministerial exception applied. But principles of church autonomy clearly were involved in these other decisions, specifically in terms of each court’s respect for and deference to each religious organization’s legally protected freedom to make employment decisions of a religious nature.
Result: Church Autonomy Doctrine Protects Employers’ Non-Ministerial Hiring
Union Gospel augments the legal landscape of church autonomy, by showing further judicial deference to a religious organization’s decisions about who to hire, why, and according to its own religious standards – whether for ministerial or non-ministerial jobs. The court indicated as well, however that its expansive protection of religious employers contains important limits. Notably, this decision does not excuse or protect decisions to discriminate based on other unlawful grounds. Assertions of religious employment requirements may not be “pretextual” for non-religious discrimination, nor may they be based on “’purely secular’ philosophical concerns” Notably too, the court did not venture so far as to address employers other than nonprofit organizations, such as commercial businesses founded on religious principles and seeking to advance religious missions. Such fact patterns remain for another judicial day.
The legal protection afforded to Union Gospel and other employers within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction thus applies to hiring co-religionists, including non-ministerial jobs, consistent with an employer’s sincerely held religious beliefs. Presumably too, this legal protection extends too to employment termination and related disciplinary matters fitting within the purview of employer decision-making, such upon a determination that an employee no longer agrees with an employer’s statement of faith, is not acting in accordance with the employer’s religious standards, is not representing the organization consistent with the employer’s religious identity, or is not otherwise contributing to an employer’s spiritually supportive environment.
Key Takeaways
What should employers do in the wake of these significant legal developments? First, consider whether the organization could reasonably be viewed as a “religious institution,” in terms of its mission, activities, and how it holds itself out to the public. Second, consider whether any employees could reasonably be viewed as “ministers,” based on their job descriptions, actual duties, and their work’s relationship to the organization’s mission. Such evaluation may perhaps be most helpful for employers outside of the Ninth Circuit, as well as for all employers addressing religious standards for hiring and retention. Third, keep the church autonomy doctrine keenly in mind – whether a church, other house of worship, other organization of a religious nature, and perhaps even a business that is grounded in religious identity, values, and activities.[4] Properly applied, the doctrine should safeguard employers’ religious liberty protections as undergirded by the First Amendment, particularly for deference to religious employers’ selection and discipline of employees.
Encompassing all such considerations, employers seeking such legal protections should well define their religious nature, accompanying attributes, and standards throughout their employment materials and practices – including governance documents, employee handbooks, and other guidance for workers and program participants. Employers should further take care to carry out their activities consistent with such standards and missional qualities. Doing so may not necessarily preclude adverse employment claims, since individuals may assert them with or without merit. But conscientious employers will be well poised to guard and defend against such claims, now more persuasively so, thanks to this trio of cases layered upon well-established religious autonomy principles.
[1] As addressed at length in our law firm’s prior blog article, the “church autonomy” doctrine extends even further such as for property matters, organizational governance, and other disputes. Additionally, while overlapping religious liberty interests exist as well for the ministerial housing allowance, it is distinctly different from the ministerial exception.
[2] The case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC firmly established the employment-related ministerial exception, by religious autonomy for churches and other religious organizations as previously recognized by appellate courts across the United States. In Hosanna-Tabor, a parochial schoolteacher sued the church/school where she worked, but not under Title VII. Instead the teacher sued the church/school under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that she had been discriminated against based on a disability. In holding for the church/school, the Court reasoned that, because it was a “religious group,” and because the teacher was a commissioned minister, with religious duties as part of her job, it was exempt from the teacher’s discrimination claims. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the church had a right to govern its internal affairs, especially with regard to the hiring and termination of its “ministers.” Because of this “ministerial exception,” the church/school’s decisions regarding her employment had to be left alone as a matter of First Amendment freedom of religion. This decision and subsequent developments are addressed in our law firm’s article focusing on the campus ministry context.
[3] In Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. Morrissey-Berru St. James Sch. v. Biel, the Supreme Court rejected a formulaic checklist approach for determining whether employees are ministers. Instead, the Court ruled more functionally: “What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.” This substantially broadened the standard of applicability, meaning that employees of religious organizations whose jobs “lie at the core of the religious organization’s mission” are likely “ministers” for purposes of the exception and therefore may not sue their employers for adverse employment actions. This ruling is further evaluated in our law firm’s related article on Our Lady.
[4] See, e.g., Braidwood Management, Inc. v. EEOC (5th Cir. 2023) (applying a state Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s balancing framework to hold that a business’s religious liberty interest outweighed the government interest in enforcing discrimination laws); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir. 2007) (applying a multi-factor test for whether a nonprofit or business is sufficiently religious to bar employment discrimination claims; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 726-27 (2014) (applying a balancing test for governmental burdening of a business’s religious exercise).
